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ABSTRACT 
 
The informal sector plays an important and quite inevitable part of the complex 
landscape that characterizes urban economy. Although part of the overall environment, it 
has its own unique characteristics and nuances that shape the lives of almost half of urban 
population in developing countries. With a contribution of almost 40% in GDP and 
employing about half the unskilled and semi skilled labor force, informal economic 
entities remain one of the most vibrant – and understudied- features of modern societies. 
While it may be argued that their basic structure belies the formal procedures, evades taxes, 
induces illegality, flays regulations and escapes any attempts to document, they remain 
one of the most visible and inherent feature of cityscape. Providing jobs to millions, 
making a family-based, community-oriented social safety net and helping (though 
formally unappreciated) in the growth and development process, it can be argued that 
informal economy – especially in today’s economic climate – is a relevant and forceful 
appendage to formal structures. 
  
A study of the raison d’etre, characteristics and unique nature of informal 
economy in Pakistan has been undertaken in this paper and attempt has been made to 
recommend alternative tax initiatives in order to nurture and help the same towards 
eventual formalization with a view to enhance the tax base and revenue in future.  
 
These recommendations/initiatives include reducing the cost of compliance for 
formalization by reducing the registration fees and accounts documentation formats; 
waiver for mandatory need for National Tax Number for making bulk purchases; 
 ii 
 
 
acceptability of property documents for obtaining bank credits and soft loans; simplifying 
bureaucratic hassles; identifying the problems created by street vendors (which constitute 
a huge portion of urban informal economy) and allowing them to ply their trade in make-
shift “Night Bazaars”; insisting upon expansion of economy through increased 
consumption rather than merely focusing on tax collection, especially the VAT which has 
huge enforcement and acceptability problems in Pakistan; and perhaps more importantly, 
the tax regulation to realize that informal economy needs to be treated separately and in a 
growing economy like Pakistan where huge agricultural sector goes untaxed for income, a 
strict and equal tax regime for overall economy might not be the solution in the short run.  
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CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION 
Developing countries invariably have an economic structure that incorporates a 
huge and visible informal sector. Although the term was used loosely in various economic 
reports, its origin as an acceptable terminology can be traced back to the 1970s. It is also 
referred to by various names such as black, shadow and underground economy. Informal 
sector may not necessarily be illegal although evading regulatory framework puts it in that 
ambit. We cannot pinpoint the exact definition but it is usually accepted that people 
working in the informal sector are “…independent, self-employed producers in urban 
areas some of whom employ family members and some of whom hire non-family workers 
or apprentices.”1  
 
Since it involves informality to a high degree of disregard for corporate and/or 
fiscal regulation, informal sector is often defined to be “…the sector of economy where 
firms engage in tax evasion”2. However, it may not necessarily entail lowered productivity; 
in-fact the opposite might be the case in many developing countries where this sector 
contributes to major productivity. 
3
 This is important in light of the fact that according to 
World Bank estimation for developing countries, the informal sector employs between 35 
and 65 percent of the labor force and contributes between 20 to 40 percent as its share in 
the GDP.
4
 
                                           
1 Centre for International Private Enterprise, Barriers to Participation: the Informal Sector in Emerging 
Economies, 2000, p4. 
 
2 Al Makrîzî Institut D’économie, Informal Sector and Taxation, Jellal Mohamed. August, 2009, Online at 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17129/ 
3 Ibid, p 8. 
4 The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 1334, Taxation, Public Services and the Informal 
Sector in a Model of  Endogenous Growth, August 1994, p2. 
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It has also been argued that the informal sector owes its presence and continued 
existence to over-regulation of the general economy --such as the incidence of high tax 
rates and transaction costs of formalization-- and inefficiency of the compliance control 
system.
5
 While public services such as transportation, the road network, government 
health and education programs, and utilities are financed only by the formal sector through 
their tax contributions, the informal sector makes use of some of these services and gets 
away with paying for none of them. Conversely, it may not be able to enforce its property 
rights through the judicial system or (in some case the police service) for fear of disclosure 
of income and wealth accumulation; nor can it benefit from the capital / insurance market 
or government credit agencies for want of regulatory requirement such as tax registration. 
But since the informal sector requires little capital and moderate skills for operation, it 
continuously uses the infrastructure provided by the government. 
 
Measurement of the informal economy can be undertaken through direct as well 
as indirect methods. The former uses voluntary survey of visibly non-regulated economic 
agents and tax audit reports which seek to assess differentials in declared and actual 
income. Examples of the latter method are the monetary approach to informal economy 
estimation based on transaction velocity of money; through data modeling from physical 
inputs such as electricity consumption as a proxy for economic activity; or using a 
complex Multiple Indicator-Multiple Cause (MIMIC) method which combines in a 
complex inter-dependent relationship, inter-alia, the tax/GDP ratio, the M2/GDP ratio with 
M2 and utility consumption to arrive at an estimation of the informal economy. Based on 
the above methods, the average estimates of the informal economy range from 23.2 to 27.3 
                                           
5 Ibid, p2. 
 3 
 
percent of the total economy of Pakistan for the years 2000~2010.
6
  
 
Economic development in Pakistan is hindered mainly by insufficient revenue 
raised through its taxation system, which is both inequitable and ineffective, in that it 
distributes the tax burden disproportionately between the formal sectors of the economy 
(agriculture, services and industry) and by doing so, fails in providing enough funds for 
development. The Tax-GDP ratio is a dismal 9.8%, whereas the average ratio during the 
last 5 years for comparable middle-income countries is 19% and has registered a growth of 
almost 3% over the period 1994-2004.
7
 Institutional and structural failures of taxation and 
governance systems in Pakistan have rendered exclusion of the informal sector from the 
tax base and mitigated its potential as a significant source of tax revenue. 
 
The research problem inherent in the incidence and growth of the informal 
economy is the fact that it is burgeoning without any containment within the regulatory 
regime and without paying its due share of economic contribution to the society in the 
form of taxes. Perhaps more critically, it seems to get away with using the resources paid 
for by the formal economy and especially the salaried middle class. It has been argued that 
the main reason for the non-inclusion of the informal economy – aside from its basic 
characteristics – is the stringent regulations and the cost of doing formal business in the 
economy. The purpose of the study, therefore, is to establish a link between formation and 
persistence of informal economies and stringent tax regimes in Pakistan; and propose a 
                                           
6 State Bank of  Pakistan Working Paper Series No 33, The Size of  Informal Economy in Pakistan, May 
2010, p11. 
 
7 The International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department, Revenue Mobilization in Developing 
Countries, March, 2011, fig.11, p29. http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/030811.pdf. 
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framework of policy measures and institutional / structural re-alignment in the existing 
regulations that will ensure recognition, measurement and development of informal sector 
in the context of over-all economic growth and development 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 This research seeks to address the following hypotheses: 
a) There is a correlation between the present structure of tax regime --along with 
related social and economic environment-- in Pakistan and continued disincentives to 
formalization by the informal sector. 
b) Economic growth and development are related to a process of recognition, 
encouragement and development of the informal sector along with a differential tax and 
continued strategic efforts for formalization. 
 
 Based on the above hypotheses, this paper seeks to answer the following question: 
a) What, if any, structural re-adjustments and policy measures can be effected in 
general and particularly by the Tax administration that will ensure inclusion of the 
informal sector in the tax net? 
b) What kinds of enforcement elements will be needed to obtain a higher degree of 
control over the informal economy? 
 
RESEARCH AGENDA 
This research will use both primary and secondary sources which will include tax 
and general economic data of Pakistan such as those available from the State Bank of 
Pakistan and Federal Board of Revenue websites. Reference will also be made to reports 
 5 
 
on the subject compiled by the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and other research agencies. Although the research is Pakistan-centric and has a significant 
practical orientation in that context alone, theoretical aspects of the role of the informal 
sector in other developing economies will also be included by making reference to 
standard material and authorities on the subject. In addition, the author will also draw from 
his own practical exposure to tax administration in Pakistan.  
 
Based on the above, this research paper seeks to construct a framework of policy 
measures helpful in designing and implementing specific issues related to the overall 
management of the informal economy. That in itself is a daunting task and requires 
analysis of the socio-political and environmental issues that shape the informal sector; 
such matters will be dealt with briefly, where necessary. However, since the scope of this 
paper is limited to resource mobilization, emphasis is placed on the tax regulation and 
formalization aspect.  
  
Academic and institutional studies on informal economy generally take the 
regulatory philosophy as an exogenous variable and focus on devising policy measures 
within that context only. However, the developing world is entering a phase of burgeoning 
informal economy which makes it a practical impossibility --not to mention, economically 
ineffective-- to treat the same at par with the formal economy. This research will highlight 
issues in that context and will seek to formulate policy design to optimize resource 
mobilization through a sustainable and focused tax treatment of the informal economy 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature relevant to the definition, extent, analysis and treatment of the informal 
sector mainly consists of three broad categories. Firstly, there are academic books on 
economics, taxation and sociology which are limited mostly to, and are helpful in, laying a 
theoretical foundation of the subject; secondly, institutional reports by international (and 
local) agencies such as the IMF, WB, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), United Nations (UN) and State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) which 
collate quantitative indicators, analyze effects of various regulatory measures and suggest 
policy guidelines based on desired economic objectives; and finally, articles in 
professional journals are available which undertake case studies in field through which 
comparison of cross-country data and policy implications can readily be made.  
 
Being a subject which has been of interest to economists only recently, the 
informal sector has yet to achieve a solid theoretical grounding. However, Michael Todaro 
in his widely acclaimed book provides a comprehensive definition of it as a part of a 
mostly urban developing economy which is “…characterized by small competitive 
individual or family firms, petty retail trade and services, labor-intensive methods, free 
entry, and market-determined factor and product prices.” Despite government policies 
which encompass “benign neglect and even outright hostility,” 8  Todaro affirms the 
continued important role of this sector in developing countries. He also provides a micro-
economic framework within which classification of the informal sector is made through its 
competition policy, entry-exit barriers, labor productivity, profitability and effects on rural-
to-urban migration. The latter characteristic is linked with the overall size and activity of 
                                           
8 Todaro, Michael P., and Stephen C Smith. 2011. Economic Development, 11th ed., Addison-Wesley, 
Boston, p327. 
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the rural sector since it contributes to adjustment of excess rural labor and, ipso-facto, to 
poverty reduction. Another important aspect of the informal sector is its ability to absorb a 
semi-skilled urban labor force at substantially lower wages and thus ease pressure on the 
formal sector which --by definition in developing countries--has a small base of output and 
employment rate. This correlation may prove to be effective in directing the future course 
of policy action towards a focused development of this sector which at present is suffering 
from what the UN-Habitat, 2011 report calls “anti-urban bias of development agencies.”9 
 
 A significant, and to date the most comprehensive and reliable, contribution to 
measurement of the informal sector in Pakistan has been made by a recent publication of 
the State Bank of Pakistan. We know that standard economic indicators of growth such as 
GDP, unemployment rate, consumption and investment rates are not truly reflective of the 
total economic activities since a significant part of them escapes documentation; and 
hence policy measures, most importantly tax-base estimation and income-tax rate criteria, 
are highly likely to be misaligned vis-á-vis economic realities on the ground. Therefore, 
estimating the size of the informal economy is of utmost importance. This task has been 
undertaken in the above- mentioned report through usage of a modified monetary 
approach, by analysis of utilities consumption patterns, most notably that of electricity, 
and by a complex Multiple-Indicator Multiple-Cause model, the latter two being used for 
the first time in Pakistan. Hence, this estimation is more indicative of the actual informal 
economy than the earlier studies which were undertaken using only the monetary approach. 
The report estimates the size of the informal economy in the period 2000-2010 at 23.2% to 
29% of the total GDP with a declining trend from 30% exhibited through 1970’s 
                                           
9 Ibid, p330. 
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onwards.
10
  
 A synopsis of the Kenyan informal economy is given in Arne Bigsten, Peter 
Kimuyu and Karl Lundvall’s article “What To Do With The Informal Sector?,” 
Development Policy Review, (November, 2004) where the authors provide an overview of 
the economic and other factors which led to the evolution, persistence and growth of the 
same in line with the Dual-Economic Sectors model established by Arthur Lewis.
11
 The 
case study of Kenyan “jua-kali” (literally, Hot-Sun in Swahili; figuratively, informal) 
sector is relevant, since Pakistan shares the same sub-sectors such as artifacts, food 
processing and unskilled general labor, comprising its informal economy along with 
almost the same degree of lax government regulation. Inasmuch as the development 
efforts have been concerned, we find the factors listed in the article including lack of 
human capacities, poor governance, low demand, poor infrastructure, inadequate capital, 
reliance on labor intensive techniques and dual industrial structure to be generally 
applicable to Pakistan as well.  
 
A debate on the role and character of the informal sector regarding its growth 
potential and its integration or otherwise with the formal sector is also a separate study in 
itself; presently due to lack of a strong and generally accepted theoretical framework, 
empirical evaluation of policy measures such as the one carried out in the above-
mentioned article fill this gap. This is also the approach taken in the present paper; hence 
the importance of such case studies cannot be over emphasized, as they provide a relevant 
                                           
10 The State Bank of  Pakistan, The Size of  the Informal Economy in Pakistan, Working Paper Series No 33, 
p11. 
 
11 Arne Bigsten, Peter Kimuyu and Karl Lundvall, 2004. What To Do with the Informal Sector? 
Development Policy Review, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, UK, November, 2004.   
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and comparable bench-mark through which various policy outcomes in other developing 
countries might be studied for modified replication in the local setup.  
 
A specific model of tax effects on the informal sector is also provided in another 
paper, “Taxes, Inequality and the Size of the Informal Sector,” Journal of Development 
Economics (February, 2003) where the authors assess the role of tax (which can be thought 
of as a formalization fee) and its effects on the income of the informal sector which are 
then proven to be complimentary to each other. It is also argued that the effects of tax are 
“ambiguous,” and it is suggested that “…caution is needed when using such simple 
minded [tax reduction] policy, often recommended in the literature as the solution to 
informalization.”12 This issue is the central theme of the present author’s paper and will 
be dealt with in some length in the succeeding chapters with specific reference to Pakistan 
and the present economic paradigm where, inter-alia, the cost of documentation has 
sharply declined due to innovations in technology; and where a renewed emphasis on 
regulatory measures are now vigorously being advocated to pull out Pakistan’s economy 
from an imminent collapse.  
  
From the above, one may be tempted to conclude that informal sector is only 
limited to transitional or developing countries; but that is not strictly the case. Although, 
worsening social and economic conditions are often the instigator to informalization, this 
trend also exists in the developed country. The sweatshops that flourish in New York are a 
good example of such kind of alternative economic mode. 
                                           
12 Sylvain Dessy and Stephane Pallage, 2003. Taxes, Inequality and the Size of  the Informal Sector, 
Journal of  Development Economics, Elsevier Science B.V., February, p233. 
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 Another aspect that seems to automatically associate itself with the informal 
economy is a negative connotation of its activities, the processes and the extent of its 
subsequent effects on the “positive economy.” This view point has resulted in a trend 
where the informal economy has been predominantly depicted as composed of negative 
attributes whilst the formal economy has been portrayed more positively as the path to 
‘progress’, ‘advancement’ and ‘modernization’.13 The two economic models are thus 
viewed not only as sequential but also in a hierarchical perspective: that not only the 
informal economy precedes the formal one, but the latter is far more legitimate than the 
former. In a sense, the informal economy is considered a remnant of pre-capitalism era, 
which is a discrepancy within the immutable framework of formalization and needs to be 
corrected; or itself will be corrected due to pressures form market forces and increasing 
government regularization of economic and business activities.  
A slightly more forgiving ‘post-Fordist’ perspective acknowledges the presence of 
the informal economy as a necessary adjunct to the modern organization but still views it 
negatively. This is in no small measure due to the fact that in recent years the informal 
economy has expanded, effectively negating the belief in formalization as something 
inevitable and natural. One of the reasons, afforded by the so-called ‘Post-Fordist Theory’ 
cites the advent of the informal economy as a “direct by-product of the advent of a de-
regulated open world economy” and the result of businesses employing creative strategies 
to reduce costs by out-sourcing labour – often hoodwinking over the strict regulations that 
inevitably accompany their formal counterpart. A classic example of this can be seen in the 
sweatshops run by garment manufacturers
14
.  
                                           
13 Ibid p237 
14 Colin C Williams and John Round, 2008. A Critical Evaluation of  Romantic Depictions of  the 
Informal Economy, Review of  Social Economy, Vol. LXVI No.3, September, 2008 
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 However, the paper cites various sources which have, in recent years, begun to 
view the informal sector as an alternative route to progress and development and evaluates 
these simplistic and binary depictions of economic dualism. One such viewpoint depicts 
the informal economy as a ‘chosen-alternative’ and a complement to the formal economy 
and thus, arguing the fact that “nurturing the informal economy is just as important as 
developing the formal economy”. Then, again, some neo-liberals view informal sector as a 
form of “popular resistance to an unfair and excessively intrusive state” and informal 
workers as “heroes casting off shackles of an over-burdensome state”. However, it has 
been argued that their actual intention is not so much as praising the virtues of informality 
than to condemn the strict regulations imposed by the barriers to entry in the formal 
regime. Yet another view of informal economy is grounded in the so called ‘radical green’ 
aspect of the now-maligned ‘export-oriented mode of production’ which is ‘ecologically 
unsustainable’; therefore, the informal economy with its reliance on indigenous duction 
methods utilizing local goods and services and meant for domestic consumption is a move 
towards a more environmentally friendly direction. This argument can be stretched to 
include a more political colour in the post-colonialist era where formalization was seen as 
being subjected to authoritarian regulations while serving the needs of a capitalist regime; 
informal sector thus provides a sort of liberation from these forces, a mandate to carry on 
self sustainable economic activity without the need to be regulated by government
15
. 
  
It is apparent from the above that the economists are having a second look at the 
importance, viability and future prospects of the informal economy. While the dual 
economy thesis was prevalent during the latter half of the last century, post modernistic 
                                                                                                                               
 
15 Ibid, p 303 
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economies (especially after the disintegration of USSR and the formation of new, regional 
centric economic blocs), the role of informal economy is being appreciated anew. A fresh 
approach to regulations needs to be undertaken and we may ask this question: is formal 
economy the only means wherefrom economic growth and development can be achieved 
or is there some alternative way to jump-start the same? 
  
While on the subject of political economics, it is hard to refute the theory that the 
informal economy and non-representation are related through a cause and effect 
phenomenon. This is very evident in the presence of the rules of the games, the 
requirements to formalization, which effectively, prevent the informal economy from 
assimilating. Informal economic actors are, by the very fact, entrepreneurs: they have no 
infrastructure to build on except their own homes or public land; no technical or 
vocational skills except those learnt through tradition or practice, or at times only the 
manual labor; no capital and loan opportunities except what they can borrow from friends 
and family. On the other hand, formal sector has all the ways and means to carry out 
business within the defined ambit of governmental regulations.  
 
It is also evident that having a clout in the form of active political representation, 
they are the ones whose interest are best served by the existing economic regime including 
tax cuts for the affluent of the society and levying across the board consumption taxes on 
basic necessities. This, then, is a phenomenon evident more on account of political turf 
rather than any social or economic reason and the presence of informal economy is largely 
due to poverty, injustice and other inequalities in the society. Indeed, “to the extent that 
excessive regulations are created to benefit particular interest groups and not society in 
general, the presence of the informal sector is a result of the failure of political institutions 
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to protect and promote an efficient market based economy”16. 
  
One of the major barriers to entry that are erected in the face of the informal 
economy is the prohibitively high cost of doing business. This effectively inhibits both 
democratic and economic transitions by imposing a high premium on transaction costs 
such as “obtaining a business license; acquiring land titles or leases; hiring employees; 
knowing and complying with applicable government laws and regulations; obtaining 
information about the price, quality and quantity of particular goods and services, about 
sources of goods and services and about potential customers; obtaining a loan; buying 
supplies; hooking up and maintaining electricity and telephone services; paying taxes; 
enforcing contracts, and so forth.”17  
 
Finally a word about the agriculture sector which constitutes the third largest 
sector of the country in terms of GDP contribution i.e 21% (after services and industrial 
sectors) and the largest in terms of labour force employment which is 45% and having 60% 
of rural population depending upon this sector. Decline in agriculture growth rate resulted 
mainly from decrease in surface water availability (in Million Acre Feet) to a dismal -13.4% 
over the average which resulted in lower crop production
 18
. With a growth rate of 3.13% 
in the fiscal year 2012 against 2.8% in the previous year
19, the agriculture sector’s 
performance is not upto the mark mainly because of natural calamities and shortage of 
                                           
16  Catherine Kuchta-Helbling, Barriers to Participation: The Informal Sector in Emerging 
Democracies, Centre for International Private Enterprise, Nov 2000. 
 
17 Ibid, p 2 
18 http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_12/02-Agriculture.pdf 
19 http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_12/highlights.pdf 
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electricity which had a growth of -1.62% in the FY 2012. Agriculture is therefore not 
taxed for Personal Income Tax in Pakistan and although instances of huge accumulated 
wealth through agricultural means are rampant, the government is still reluctant to include 
this sector within the tax bracket mainly due to pressures form legislators who mostly 
belong to feudal and landed gentry. Although it has been argued
20
 that taxing agriculture 
would be one of the ways to achieve potential annual revenue of Rs.250-300 Bn and to tap 
the “structural shift of income towards untaxed sectors” and to create tax equity, it is still a 
debate whether or not to tax this sector where inefficiencies abound and practical on 
ground situation demands a gradual shift in the policy. It has been counter-argued that due 
to decreasing land holding sizes, already existing provincial tax regimes and the possibility 
of burdening poor farmers instead of big land lords, imposition of any agricultural tax will 
not be efficient.
21
 It is due to this reason that agriculture has not been discussed in this 
rudimentary paper as a possible solution to Pakistan’s tax inequities and the focus has been 
kept fixed on the policy treatment to informal sector of the economy.  
  
 
 
 
 
  
                                           
20 http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/EcoFinance/BP42-
TaxingtheAgricultureIncomeInPakistan.pdf 
21 ibid 
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CHAPTER III: PAKISTAN’S INFORMAL ECONOMY 
 The informal economy in Pakistan, like any other developing country, is a mix of 
many different elements, social, political and environmental. Liberated from the British 
Raj only 64 years ago in the year 1947 and dismembered after 24 years in the year 1971, 
Pakistan’s economy has seen both good and worst times. In recent times, the economy has 
taken a downturn mainly due to the devastating consequences of natural calamities, huge 
expenditure (both social and fiscal) on being a strategic partner in the Afghan War, huge 
electricity shortages and a general inflationary trend in the country. In such times, the 
informal economy of the country is receiving a mixed blessing with its labor-intensive 
dependency and dual linkages with the formal economy.  
 
 The characteristics of the country’s informal economy are multifold and comprise 
both the ‘informal by compulsion’ and ‘informal by design’ classes. The former is the poor, 
uneducated and mostly urban individual or households who are compelled to make their 
living through employments and entrepreneurships that is classic informality: they make 
use of the pubic goods and services and yet, do not contribute to the public exchequer in 
the form of regulation fees and taxes. This is not surprising because with a Poverty Gap of 
18.74 (at $2/day, PPP) escalating poverty is one of Pakistan’s biggest economic problems. 
The Kuznet’s ratio is (Top20% / Bottom 40%) is {42.1/ (9.0+12.8)} = 1.93 (coupled with 
the Gini coefficient of 0.33
22
) which is a significant indication of inequality distributed 
throughout the society. Similarly, considering the present minimum wage for monthly 
unskilled labor is about $ 70, amounting to a mere $2.3/day, this aggravation of informal 
sector employment is not surprising. The major fields of such players are restricted to 
                                           
22 Todaro, Michael P., and Stephen C Smith. 2011. Economic Development, 11th ed., Addison-Wesley, 
Boston 
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traditional cottage industries which used to comprise power looms for making textiles, 
handicrafts, street food and other goods vendors, domestic help, brick-kiln making, 
transport sector, small scale manufacturing, whole sale and retail trade, construction 
workers, corner shops, sweetmeat packaging, home based dairy supply, cooking services, 
sanitary workers, home based beauty parlors, auto mechanics, etc. Since informal work is 
not classified by any moral connotations, smugglers, drug traffickers, sex workers, 
gamblers, extortionists and all sorts of other mafia can also be classified in this category. 
This class of economy can reasonably be said to have no choice except to continue with 
their employment in the face of rising economic pressures and major disincentives to 
formalize. 
 
 The latter class of informal economy comprises of the rising middle class and 
affluent tax evaders which have gained a major foothold in the politico-economic 
framework of the country. Not all disincentives to formalization can be based solely on 
poverty and economic hardship considerations, though: greed and the get-rich-quick 
fixation play perhaps a greater role in evading taxes and continuing the informal structure 
of business and employment. Thus, the tuition centres in urban areas catering to the mass 
of school and college students are a classic example of a middle class rip off: they 
presumably cater to a noble and rather necessary goal – that of filling the gap of strict 
standardization requirements and the dismal teaching level at many educational 
institutions. Yet in doing so, they very conveniently avoid paying any kind of due taxes by 
keeping the documentation non-existent and operating strictly on cash basis to avoid any 
indication of their income and expenditure.  
 
 Similarly, in urban areas of the country there is a proliferation of the so-called 
 17 
 
“Baara Markets’ – a haven of smuggled goods mainly from neighboring China. These 
markets are filled with garments, consumer electronics, cosmetics and house hold crockery 
and utensils which are either brought in through ‘khaypias’ or smuggled in from the 
porous borders of neighboring Afghanistan, China, etc. ‘Khaypia’ is a specialized 
messenger service wherein a person goes offshore, usually to such places as Dubai, Far-
east, China, etc, and brings in huge number of consumer goods as baggage to be 
exclusively sold in those markets. Of course, without the active involvement of Customs 
officials, this practice is not possible. Such goods are also blatantly displayed at many 
departmental stores around the cities in open defiance of the country’s import regulations. 
This is also evident in the insistence of many shops to have cash as their primary and 
preferred means of transactions in order to avoid documentation of their sales. 
 
 Another case of such blatant exploitation is the one carried out by a class of people 
who should be most honest – the religious preachers. Pakistanis are a deeply religious 
people and preaching, especially in the holy months of Ramadan, Moharram and Rabi-ul-
Awwal is a thriving business. Preachers and religious hymn-singers earn in thousands of 
Rupees per hour and yet no tax at 6% is deducted at their payments in stark violation of 
section 153 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The fact that this blatant violation is made 
for a religious service is all the more shameful. 
 
 Shameful indeed is yet another class of informal economy, which though is 
relatively small in number but perhaps outstrips the major players in formal economy in 
respect of profit and accumulated wealth. This is the black and underground economy 
sector comprising of high stakes stock market plays, illegal money transfers, smuggling, 
drug trafficking and extortionist activities. It can be rightly termed the criminal side of 
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informal economy as opposed to mere irregular one, mentioned above. The Big Hawala 
networks, an alternative remittance transfer system operated mainly from the Gulf 
countries where South Asian labour is located, which were active a few years back have 
now been somewhat curbed by the State Bank’s policy of requiring the banks to know 
their customers. The threat of money transfer for terrorist activities has also clamped down 
this attitude to some extent; however, ‘Hawala’ (or Hundi, as it is alternatively known) is 
still a vibrant business and a major contributor to tax evasion by setting up a shadow 
banking system.  
   
 Another manifestation of evading taxes by using the very means meant for 
inducing formalization is the widespread usage of banking system. This trend can be seen 
in the dismal ratio of taxpayers vs. bank account holders (which is almost 1:30
23
); it can be 
argued that many people have more than one bank account, some are not subject to direct 
taxation and many are exempt (such as those having agriculture income). However, even 
with all such justifications, the ratio is too huge to merit waiver of any wrongdoing 
involved.  
 
 It is also apparent that tax evasion in the informal economy need not be invisible 
although many activities, mostly criminal, are by that very fact disguised. One example of 
that is the tacit government allowance of providing subsidy on electricity; a fact which has 
helped the mushroom growth of informal economy. Spurred on by the multifaceted 
problems besetting the electric generation politics (such as no bills for the tribal areas 
adjacent to water dams, huge line losses, corruption in allocating rental power plants, 
reliance on costly furnace oil rather than exploiting coal reserves, political bribery of oil 
                                           
23 M. Munir Qureshi, Pakistan’s Informal Economy.  
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marketing companies, privatization of State owned enterprises, stoppage of cheap Saudi 
oil, etc), a subsidy on the already inefficient electricity generation is tantamount to 
increasing disposable income of the consumers.  
 
It is well known that an effective method of estimating the size of the economy is 
the electricity consumption ratio vis-à-vis the GDP growth. An almost unit elasticity is 
maintained that can be made from between the two indicators so that electricity 
requirement can be practically measured by estimation of a country’s GDP. Another 
important indication that can be gauged form this analysis is the size of the informal 
economy which is the differential between the electricity consumption (per capita) and the 
consequent GDP. In other words, the amount of electricity needed to produce the GDP is 
subtracted from the actual electrical production and the rest is attributed as the 
consumption made by the informal sector
24
. The electric power consumption (kWh per 
capita) in 1980 was 132 and the corresponding GDP per capita was 357 US$; in 2008, the 
most recent figures available, the figures were 433 kWh/capita and 1,007 US$ respectively. 
Based on the percentage change every year for the 28 years (1980~2008), the following 
graph depicts the high proportional change in electricity consumption vis-à-vis GDP per 
capita change and is a good indicator of the increasing size of informal economy in the 
country.
                                           
24 Ahmed Gulzar, Novaira Junaid, Adnan Haider: What is hidden in the hidden economy of  Pakistan? 
Size, causes, issues and implications.  
http://www.pide.org.pk/psde/25/pdf/agm26/day2/Ahmed%20Gulzar.pdf 
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Fig 1: Percentage change comparison in Electricity Consumption & GDP. (The blue line is Electric Power 
Consumption per capita (% change) and the red line is GDP per capita (% change).  
   
Based on this approach, estimates of the informal economy in Pakistan have been 
made
25
 at 30.67 for the year 1974 to 47.62% of the GDP for the year 2010. As a 
comparison, on average the Asian countries exhibit an informal economy at 41% of their 
GDP. The estimation, of course, depends upon the indicators and the model used. Based 
on the above, a graph of the estimations is as follows. It can be seen that the informal 
economy has been fluctuating about the mean of a little less than 50% of GDP. This 
implies that the economy of the country has been under-reported by almost half of the 
amount throughout the years. This has grave repercussions for efficiency of tax collection, 
tax-actual-GDP ratio and other major macro-economic indicators which help the policy 
makers in devising strategies for the country’s growth and development. 
                                           
25 Ibid p 39. 
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Fig 2: Estimation of the informal economy as % of GDP throughout the years 
  
The size of the informal economy is only an indication of the causes and problems 
inherent in the continued existence of informal sector. All the factors listed above have 
been instrumental in creating disincentives to formalization. Besides, we can list many 
other social and environmental reasons that are prevalent in the country. Pakistan has a 
very dismal Tax-GDP ratio of 9.8 and only about 3 million taxpayers, a large chunk of 
which are salaried taxpayers. Besides, a low literacy rate, continuous devaluation of 
currency and low growth rate of public sector development expenditures have also been 
cited as major impediments to formalization. Potential reasons which may see increase in 
the informal sector include rise in cross border smuggling, decreasing arte of general 
purchasing power, price hike of petroleum and electricity, weak law enforcement and 
increasing corruption
26
. 
 
 There are many social and economic reasons for the flourishing of the informal 
                                           
26 Ibid p 21. 
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economy besides the above mentioned. One of them seems to be the huge wage 
differential between the formal and the informal sector. Recent
27
 surveys indicate that 
almost 60% of employees work in the informal sector and only 30% of them are regular; 
the rest of the employees are either contractual or daily wage workers. Non-regular female 
workers in the informal sector are almost 80% of the labour which accounts for 54% of all 
female employment in the country. During the past decade, cross classification of 
enterprise type (formal, informal) with wages show a wide differential with the informal 
sector suffering a fall in average wage. As is expected, female employees in the informal 
sector have continually been registering the lowest money wage growth
28
. This situation is 
indicative of two major cause of concern for the policy makers: the low status, and literacy 
rate, of women in the society coupled with the fact that formalization requirements are so 
strict as to effectively persuade entrepreneurs to back out. While sociologists might agree 
that the entry of women in labor force is a welcome move and even lower wages are better 
than nothing, Pakistani society has yet to incorporate women as an active and equally 
productive wage earner.  
 
 As an example of the formalization requirements, we can cite the requirement to 
register the firm for number of employees exceeding 10 and to accordingly pay social 
security contribution in their respect. Another reason which is perhaps the biggest 
contributor towards ineffective documentation of records is the fact that before the Income 
Tax Ordinance, 2001, the previous (repealed) Tax code had no specific provision for 
requiring a taxpayer to keep any sort of standard accounting documents. Documentation of 
                                           
27 Dr. Muhammad Irfan: Pakistan’s Wage Structure: During 1990/91 to 2006/07, Pakistan Institute of  
Development Economics, December 2008, p 8. 
 
28 Ibid, p 16 
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business in Pakistan at the small business/partnership or individual level followed the 
traditional book-keeping from the pre-independence days which were non-standardized 
and often written in local languages. It was the responsibility of the tax authorities to 
translate and transcribe the same and make whatever sense they can out of it to extract 
taxable income from it. More often than not, they resorted to making an educated guess for 
tax incidence and subsequently levied tax on the same. This practice and experience has 
resulted into the time honored tradition of the tax authorities in Pakistan to resort to 
calculating Gross profit ratios for individual sectors based on previous averages and 
escape the burdensome task of annual assessment. The taxpayers, obviously, had no 
objection to this practice which requires no effort on their part for documentation and 
regularized their tax payments to a comfortable average. This lacuna on part of the 
previous tax code is perhaps the single most technical reason for the proliferation of 
informal economy. The mistake has now been corrected but the damage it did flourishes 
on and is resultant in the continuation of informal activities in the country. 
 
 Urbanization is another important factor that caters to the huge growth of 
informal economy. With 36% of total urban population and a rapid annual change rate of 
3.1%
29
, Pakistan is fast running out of urban space to cater to the surplus labor force which 
is naturally absorbed in low-paid, semi-skilled, non-regular employment. Most of such 
labor is illiterate, have a family to support back in village and are employed in fields 
which do not increase their vocational skills such as domestic help, transportation and 
general labor. However, a substantial number of them with some luck choose relatively 
better jobs as auto-mechanics, cooks, factory apprentices and house painters which 
vocation can assure a substantial income from what they were making at the villages. 
                                           
29 http://www.indexmundi.com/pakistan/urbanization.html 
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CHAPTER IV:  ISSUES IN TAXING INFORMAL ECONOMY 
Now that we have a somewhat clear idea of the nature, characteristics and extent 
of the informal economy, we can begin to see some of the issues that plague the regulator 
in making an assessment of, and subsequently, capture the informal economy for 
formalization. As expected, the size of the informal economy is positively correlated with 
tax burden and labor market restriction (in effect, barriers to formalization); it is also 
negatively related with proxies for quality of governance, institutional strength and rule of 
law along with related peripherals of corruption, security (economic and otherwise), 
cultural inclinations and ideological attachments of the people
30
.  
 
Therefore, it is imperative that at the first instant we decide whether or not to tax 
the informal economic activities. We first analyze the reasons for not taxing the same. 
Economic hardship, poverty and general level of income in the country result in taxation 
being unfair to the masses. Since the government is providing no substantial services to 
the poor people, and they have almost little or no representation in the political field, 
slapping them with direct taxation is almost illogical. Coupled with the fact that indirect 
taxation in the form of the Sales Tax ranges from 10% to 17% on goods and services that 
include basic necessities, any move towards stringent enforcement of direct taxation in its 
present stage will only be counter-productive.  
 
Federal government expenditure has recently shown an increasing trend towards 
non-development expenditure including defense expenditures for the on-going war on 
terror. Similarly, the natural calamities such as recent floods and earthquakes have resulted 
                                           
30 See Sangeeta Pratab, Erwan Quintin: The Informal Sector in Developing Countries: Output, Assets 
and Employment. P 8 
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in decreased government capacity to incorporate new development initiatives that increase 
employment in general. Resultantly, the government has to resort to inefficient schemes 
such as the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) whereby US$10 per month are given 
to the selected poor families. Obviously political favoritism and corrupt practices cannot 
be ruled out while practically wasting millions of rupees in non productive activities; this 
also results in a lack of confidence in government’s ability and subsequently no desire to 
pay any taxes.  
 
On the other hand, totally exempting the informal sector from any kind of taxation 
is also not a viable option. The revenue needs of the government are increasing and the 
macro-economic indicators do not post a healthy trend. Combined with the fact that the 
informal economy has shown a persistent increased trend and phenomenal growth over the 
decades implies that under-taxing the same results in substantial loss of revenue to the 
exchequer. It has also been argued that a tendency to under-tax the informal economy is a 
disincentive for the formal sector to pay taxes. There is an indication from Latin American 
countries regarding increase in the tax compliance of formal sector if the informal sector is 
relatively small. Thus, ignoring informal sector activities will result in lower morale and 
general non compliance of Tax regulations.
31
 
 
Yet, another reason for not completely roping-in the informal sector while 
devising tax policies is of State legitimacy. Informalization has been perceived as a 
negative reaction to the State failure and a proxy for lack of confidence in the 
                                           
31 Joseph R A Ayee, 2007; Building Tax Compliance through Reciprocity with Government, Paper 
presented at the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) of  the World Bank Group Regional 
Conference on the theme “Enterprise Formalization in Africa”, held at the Alisa Hotel, Accra on 
January 10 – 11, 2007 
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government’s ability to provide for the protection of life and property. With some 
dissatisfaction at the country’s federal character, especially in the troubled province of 
Baluchistan, this is the sort of question the government would wish to avoid at all costs. In 
such times, the writ of the State is equated with its ability to enforce regulations across the 
board and not being able to tap the huge resource of untaxed income is abject failure on 
part of the State. It may even be argued that the players in the informal economy are 
willing to discharge their duty in lieu of recognition of their legitimacy and gaining a clean 
slate for their past assets. Indeed, this is one of the powerful arguments and experience has 
shown its feasibility: tax authorities have regularly issued tax amnesty schemes whereby 
illegal money can be ‘whitened’ simply by paying a nominal surcharge, without any fear 
of ever invoking questions of its origin and penalties thereof.  
 
After delineating the arguments both for and against tax treatment of the informal 
sector, it is clear that the policy choice is difficult at best. No clear theoretical foundations 
exist, which guide us towards the basic questions, which is whether or not to treat the 
informal sector any different than the formal one. Practical considerations and the ground 
politico-economic reality suggests that prudence, coupled with long term strategy and 
immediate need for enhanced revenue mobility, should guide our policies towards the 
informal sector. This paper is concluded by outlining the following policy 
recommendations categorized within Political Perspective, Capacity Constraints, Tax 
Policies and Institutional Framework. 
 
Political Perspective: The political perspective involves political favoritism by 
parties promising tax exemptions to certain sectors of the economy in lieu of votes and 
campaign contributions. Pakistan has a long history of political bribery and political 
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parties can readily be identified with their economic support groups. Not only is there an 
effective blockage of the possibility of any tax measure affecting the ruling elite, such as 
the much needed agriculture income tax, but the Federal Board of Revenue, the apex tax 
collecting agency in the country, is highly politicized as well. The Chairman of the FBR is 
usually the first officer to be changed whenever a new government takes office and the 
length of his tenure in the coveted posting is an indication of his loyalty – and therefore, 
acceptability – by his political masters. 
 
Tax has increasingly been seen in Pakistan as a negative connotation – not as a 
responsibility and duty of citizenship but more of a burden to avoid. The main reason for 
this is the lack of trust in government priorities evidenced by out-of-control negative 
economic and social indicators and increasing non-development expenditure. The inability 
to bring about peace in security situation is also a challenge that the government seems 
quite incapable to deal with. 
 
Capacity Constraints: Taxing the informal economy is altogether different than 
applying regular tax laws to formal sector. Informal economy is undocumented which 
effectively means no accounting mechanism exists to help assess the income level. Since 
informal economic activities are spread over the entire urban landscape (residential houses, 
lands, streets, slums, etc) rather than in a limited and readily identifiable space (such as 
factory and offices in case of formal economy), identification and location of specific 
activities is a daunting task for any tax administrator. It is also far more difficult on an 
institutional and personal level to develop linkages with the players of informal sector and 
gain knowledge of the practices, constraints, trends and Gross Profit ratios of those sectors. 
In Pakistan, the tribal belt is one such area where the laws are not applicable and most of 
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the smuggling and drug/arms trafficking is taking place in those areas. Here, the 
constraints of the tax machinery are very much evident since it is not equipped with 
security measures to effectively combat such situations. In urban areas, many towns are 
effectively no-go areas where even the Police have trouble enforcing the law. The Inland 
Revenue Service does not have any such protection, which, for instance, the Pakistan 
Customs has for protection against border smugglers. 
 
The usual constraints of the tax machinery such as low morale, high corruption, 
no institutional training system and a lethargic approach towards enforcing penal 
provisions of law are also responsible towards possible failure in effectively taxing the 
informal economy. 
 
Tax Policies: The Presumptive Tax regime has been instituted by the government 
precisely to avoid having to assess the informal sector in the face of all the constraints 
mentioned above. It has been argued that “Taxation based on formal systems of income 
calculation, accounts and payment options is not appropriate to much of the informal 
sector. Direct presumptive taxation may be more promising.”32 It was perhaps this motive 
to increase the tax base through targeting the informal economic activities that, in Ghana 
in 1986, a new experiment to collect tax through the members of associations was 
instituted. This tax collection relied specifically on a scheme called Identifiable Grouping 
Taxation (ITG) and was implemented in the transport sector where a huge gap existed 
between the tax actually paid (which was close to nothing) and the tax due. The gist of the 
scheme was to make the association as a sort of a withholding agent for tax collection 
from and within its members. This scheme relied on the immediate knowledge of the 
                                           
32 Ibid, p 5 
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association of its members and which would serve to rectify the inability of the country’s 
Revenue department to collect due taxes. The tax collected in terms of the overall potential 
of payment was obviously small, given the fact that the association was not eager to 
punish its members severely or to remit the total amount to the government. This also 
underlined the sometimes illegal and mafia-like attitude displayed by informal economy 
players in developing country – a problem that is no less severe in Pakistan as well. But a 
culture of tax payment was established in Ghana through this experiment although it could 
no longer be kept at a viable pace due to various politico-economic considerations. 
Nevertheless, the experiment can be successful in Pakistan because informal sector 
associations are rampant and tax can easily be collected from them at the detriment of not 
auditing the individual member. The experiment in Ghana was in late 1980s when not only 
the technological knowhow nor a political will along with capacity of tax officials was 
developed to optimal extent; in the 21
st
 century, we can hope to tap this huge resource of 
untaxed revenue by applying the same policy design, although perhaps localized 
procedures, to work in Pakistan. 
 
It is also appropriate to question whether or not the tax administration is capable 
of taxing the illegal activities which abound in the society. This is more of philosophical 
question rather than a practical one since the tax code does not distinguish between 
immoral or illegal activities for the purpose of taxation of income. However, for obvious 
reasons, neither proper documentation of the same has been made (hence no reliable data 
available) nor any substantial categorization has been undertaken to determine the tax 
incidence from this sector.  
 
Another tax policy design that can be implemented in specific response to the 
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characteristics inherent in, challenges posed by and needs determined of, the informal 
sector is what I would term “Taxation for Development” paradigm. The salient features of 
the said paradigm follow the arguments to determine why taxing informal economy is 
inefficient, impractical and imprudent and makes the following claims: 
 
Claims on Inefficiency:  
i) Tax revenues are not significantly raised through increase in tax base of  
informal economy.  
ii) The low capacity of  tax administration to effectively detect informal 
economy tax “Avoision”. 
iii) The increased chances of  malpractices and corruption. 
 
Claims on Impracticality:  
iv) Tax machinery in Pakistan is not equipped to recognize, detect and bring 
into tax net all informal economic activities. 
v) No documentation will result in huge un-detected economic transactions. 
vi) Tax machinery is understaffed and ill equipped with the ways and means 
to cover all such economic activity. 
 
Claims on Imprudence:  
vii) Informal economy constitutes a huge voter-base and hence cannot be 
taxed regularly or with significance due to political pressures. 
viii) Past failure of  administration to rope in the tax evaders 
 
Therefore, in order to eventually include informal economy within the overall 
formal framework of  the economy, the following measures need to be undertaken: 
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Short term:  
i) Deregulate the informal economy from ambit of  regular tax laws. 
ii) Improve sustainability of  security, utility and civic services provision. 
iii) Soft loans for entrepreneurial initiative should be given. Consolidation of  
all such government led organizations into a central body to provide 
sector specific guidance and loans. 
iv) Evaluation of  specific sector studies to determine average Gross profit 
ratio to assess profitability margin. 
v) Income Tax holiday to be provided. Reduced or No Sales Tax rate to be 
implemented and no requirement of  Return filing for 5 years except 
nominal Return for monitoring purposes till the entrepreneur achieves 
the threshold Gross Profit ratio for a continued period of  3 years.  
 
Long term: 
i) Improving the capacity of  the Tax machinery to recognize and evaluate 
the informal economic sectors through better training facilities, sector 
notes preparation and coordination with other regulators. 
ii) Bringing the informal economy gradually into the regular Sales Tax and 
Income Tax regime only after self  sufficiency and sustainability of  the 
taxpayer and the sector as a whole is achieved as per above criteria. 
 
Institutional Framework: We need to see harmony in achieving objectives of the 
government by all departments. Economic management is not worked out by any one 
agency in isolation. It is a collective effort for which proper roles should be defined and 
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incentives laid out. Public sector institutional reform is the key to building bridges with 
the citizens and making them aware of their rights and duties as responsible partners in 
development.  
 
There is also a need to make tax evasion a criminal act which should be a 
cognizable offence by law enforcement agencies. However, it can also be argued that 
given the huge trust deficit accompanied by rampant corruption and peripheral capacity of 
the Police and the Judiciary to dispense justice to the people, this move would perhaps be 
more resisted than complied with. Arming the FBR, seen by many as the usual corruption 
suspect, with even more penal provisions would be more counter-productive when the 
agency has yet to utilize any of the provisions already present in the law.  
 
At present we see a myriad of institutions engaged in the same goal of bringing 
development assistance to the poor economic sectors but ending up being inefficient due 
to lack of a shared and common goal and too much bureaucratic hassles.  
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CHAPTER V:  FORMALIZING THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 
Perhaps the biggest challenge in informal economy management is to have 
sustainable and continued compliance by the players with the market rules of the game 
and the only way to ensure that is to bring formalization to the sector. This activity is not 
only vastly difficult but it has all sorts of difficulties and inherent dilemmas attached with 
the characteristics of informal economy.  
 
As a first step we may recognize that the informal sector needs to be treated 
differently than the formal one and therefore, in order to help the former on the way to 
eventual formalization, it has been argued that to “design an ad-hoc regulatory system, 
different existing regulatory schemes…involv[ing] the adoption of dual or preferential 
regimes.”33 But this is usually opposed on grounds of fairness and the complications 
associated with duality of economic systems. It is also argued that such a regime may lead 
to stagnation of the very enterprise it is meant to liberate. However, this does not preclude 
the possibility of having on ground differential treatment for instance in tax procedures, an 
example of which is the Presumptive tax regime. In Pakistan, many retailers and whole-
sellers (essentially belonging to a very visible informal sector) avail this facility through 
tax rates that may be as low as 0.5% of their total turnover. 
 
A second option can very well be having a non-exclusionary regime and lowering 
the barriers to formalization by reducing costs of compliance such as registration fees and 
requirements. Another way of looking at this arrangement is to consider the informal 
sector as a client rather than a regulated player and to adapt the formalization requirements 
                                           
33 Victor E. Tokman, Integrating the informal sector in the modernization process. 
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to the ground realities and capabilities of the players. This can be done in either striking 
down some requirements (such as National Tax Number requirement for purchases); 
lowering the fees for incorporation or accepting practical arrangements for a more legal 
one. An example of the latter can be the acceptability of property documents as a valid 
way to obtain a bank credit; at present a host of other documents are usually called for 
including Income Tax Returns and Sales Tax Registration, etc. In-fact, this example is 
more than relevant since more often than not a lack of capital, and not entrepreneurial 
abilities, hampers the growth of a home-based cottage industry or a family shop. This may 
be within the spirit of the law although examples can be found of government adopting 
such methodologies for a specific purpose. The relaxation of the State Bank’s recent 
prudential regulations amendment regarding collateral requirement to accept any 
documented property including their inventories, moveable property, and receivables is 
therefore, a welcome step on this direction.
34
  This reactionary spirit is evident in the 
numerous tax amnesty schemes approved by FBR for the precise purpose of whitening the 
black economy. For a mere 2% of the tax to be collected, the whole concept of economic 
fidelity was given away.  
 
Perhaps, the biggest impediments to making an economic sense of all this is the 
current tax administration trend which is focused on expanding tax base and relying more 
and more collection from Value Added Taxation (VAT). Evidently, any attempt to be 
lenient on the informal economic sectors can be seen to be exempting a huge potential of 
tax revenue while giving a “soft” impression of the government in terms of 
implementation. However, as has been argued above, it will benefit the economy in the 
long run through real growth which may, paradoxically, remain undocumented due to the 
                                           
34 http://www.cipe.org/blog/?p=9834 
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nature of such transactions.  
 
Building trust regarding the government’s ability to perform its stipulated duty 
and only then assume the moral and legal right to collect due taxes through lawful means 
is also very important. The political dimension of creating such a trust is beyond the scope 
of this treatise; however, simplifying procedures through less bureaucratic hassles and 
providing a one-window operation of registration and tax issues will certainly go a long 
way in improving the services to the people and hence, having them realize their 
citizenship duties.  
 
Another way to increase facilitation for a sizeable number of informal sector 
player who ply their merchandize on street (street vendors and small shops encroaching 
upon public spaces) is to provide for a balanced strategy for providing the citizens their 
right to enjoy public space, as well as letting the vendors sell their inexpensive stuff. In 
Pakistan, as in most developing countries, street economy is a major part of a thriving 
urban business where the right to occupy a particular corner is often paid for by heavy 
bribes to the Police and/or town administration. One way of doing that is to create “Night 
Markets” where vendors can have their regular trade carried out in makeshift 
arrangements of tents and portable cubicles; in fact this recommendation is workable 
because most of the goods sold on streets are perishables, eatables, toys, stationery items 
and cloths which can be easily accommodated. Aside from Night Markets on streets on 
stipulated days, the local administration can also arrange to have local play grounds, 
parking areas and parks converted to instant bazaars for this purpose. In this way, the usual 
daily traffic in the morning and afternoon will not be hampered by the presence of vendors 
and the vendors will also be assured of their livelihood for the day. This suggestion is of 
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course not applicable for beggars, drug peddlers or sex workers or any other sector 
creating public nuisance.  
 
A look at the business environment of formal and informal organizations may also 
be relevant here. With the advent of faster means of supply chains and increasing 
competitiveness, large formal organizations are adopting flexible productive systems to 
cater to “the supply-side fluctuations: by producing goods upon request and by getting 
closer to customers before and after delivering the goods. This is the kind of approach 
traditionally followed by small businesses. [Therefore] a new opportunity is opening 
up.”35 This presents a challenge where through a culture change in the informal sector, a 
more comprehensive and success oriented strategy will result in better profits and hence, 
by dint of necessity, a need to incorporate in the main stream economic regime.  
 
 It is important to our understanding that a vibrant informal economic sector is in 
the larger interest of the country’s economic growth, though its persistence is also an 
indication of growing consumer demand and imperfect market conditions along with the 
usual inherent reasons such as barriers to entry and strict taxation regime. Perhaps the 
biggest change for the policy makers is to start viewing the informal economy as a partner 
in progress; an extra-legal arm of the formal economy which needs to be nurtured and 
brought into the fold rather than be abandoned and left to wander along the murky 
corridors of illegality. 
 
 
                                           
35 Victor E. Tokman, Integrating the informal sector in the modernization process, p 11 
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CHAPTER VI:  PROPOSED TAX REGIMES 
Pakistan’s tax structure is highly skewed towards the formal sector in the sense 
that it taxes every income that is documented and netted within the economy. Since the 
country is not highly industrialized, many financial transactions also take place within the 
old system of cash and/or indigenous methods of borrowing and transfer of money. Often 
these methods are illegal such as hawala, which employs transfer of money without 
movement of money thus bypassing the normal banking channels. It is largely based on an 
honour code which is recognized within the industry and, contrary to popular belief, works 
within the country as well as outside it. The unique feature of hawala is that the system 
generates no financial documentation and therefore, escapes regulatory detection. 
 
In the absence of such evidence, it is indeed very difficult for an equitable tax 
regime to undertake policies which might evenly distribute the national burden on various 
taxpayers. The IMF report
36
on revenue mobilization contends that small businesses may 
not be the best revenue generators since they have fixed tax revenue potential. It also 
points out a fundamental dilemma of regulators in that they devote huge resources to 
extract taxes out of this segment but often the costs are too high to justify the results. The 
report further states that the tax treatment of such businesses may have an important role, 
which is above and beyond any revenue mobility in that it has employment generating 
capabilities and, consequently, political importance. In fact, it goes on to suggest that such 
taxes ease competitiveness and eases distortions even if the revenue impact is inefficient.
37
 
 
Another area in which tax regimes are deficient is the use of VAT which is hardly 
                                           
36 International Monetary Fund, Revenue Mobilization in Developing Countries, 2011, p.39 
37
 Ibid, p.40 
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efficient in that the compliance may not be made properly given the non-documentation of 
economy in general and the reluctance of people in particular to evade any taxes they 
deem to be discriminatory. In Pakistan, recent attempt by the government to introduce VAT 
in the nomenclature of Reformed General Sales Tax (RGST) has been met with resistance 
and effective boycott by the trade associations especially in the post 2011 flood scenario in 
the country. 
38
 
  
Contributing to this dismal economic scenario is the fact that domestic taxation 
specifically the Personal Income tax (PIT) shows the most unfavorable growth potential 
among the major tax streams i.e. PIT, Sales Tax, Excise Duty and Customs Duty. The 
Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), the apex tax regulator in Pakistan, released the figures
39
 
of tax collection for the penultimate quarter of the FY 2012 according to which, the 
growth in domestic taxes is estimated at 25.1% as compared to the previous period; 
however, that is largely due to the Sales Tax (33.3%) and not the PIT.  
 
 Coupled with the fact that these figures should also be offset against the rising 
                                           
38 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C11%5C22%5Cstory_22-11-2010_pg7_31 
39 http://www.fbr.gov.pk/Docs/201249144024563TaxCollectionFIgure.pdf 
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inflation estimated
40
 at 11.3% for April 2012 in the country (as shown below) speaks of 
not only the unwillingness of taxpayers to pay the PIT but also the failure of regulators 
who rely on rising price of goods to generate positive indicators of Sales Tax increases.  
 
 
  
Another reason for low PIT collection is the low number of Returns filed by the 
taxpayers themselves. Already the dismally small figure of about 2.2 Million taxpayers are 
showing a declining trend of filing of Income Tax Returns with the filers dwindling from 
1.965 Million in FY 2010 to 1.3 Million for the FY 2011
41
.  
  
One more reason for decline in direct taxation is the cut in Public Sector 
Development Program (PSDP) which results in huge withholding taxes on development 
projects contracts. This trend seems to persist as direct taxation touches 39% of the total 
revenue realization and PIT contributes minimally to that basket.
42
 
 Coupled with the worsening socio-political conditions of the country and low 
                                           
40 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/inflation-cpi 
41 http://dawn.com/2012/02/27/enforcing-tax-compliance/ 
42 http://www.fbr.gov.pk/Docs/201215151230514Final%20Yearbook%202010-11.pdf 
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prestige in the eyes of international donors, it seems imperative that a tax regime is 
introduced which caters to the peculiar nature of informal economic sectors, provides 
relief to the players and seeks to formally induct them in regular economic structure in a 
progressive, gradual and practical way. Delineated below are some of the 
recommendations which, inter-alia, may outline and define the broad scope and extent of 
such a tax regime: 
 
i) The tax regime should first and foremost realize that the purpose of 
taxation in a developing country is not just revenue collection but to provide a conducive 
economic environment for players of various categories and orientations. Informal 
economy exists in the region for centuries and no regulatory framework will be able to net 
it within the normal environment fully. Leakages will always be present either by legal 
failure (lacunae in the law by which tax is effectively evaded), corruption or simply 
inability to regulate everything. Poverty, lawlessness, political patronage and adherence to 
traditional way of life (including barter transactions, non maintenance of records, etc), 
distrust in State agencies all contribute towards a societal attitude in which tax is seen as a 
burden to be avoided rather than a duty to be performed. 
 
ii)  The informal sector is already subject to various taxation regimes such 
as Sales Tax on general consumption, property taxes by local governments and 
withholding taxes on electricity, telephone, gas and water bills. These taxes are 
unavoidable and contribute towards cost escalation of their life style maintenance as well 
as low profit margin for their products. It must be remembered that informal sector goods 
and services have a limited scope and extent due to their low quality and limited shelf life. 
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iii) For the numerous reasons discussed above, subjecting the informal sector 
to PIT is counterproductive as far as the present structure of the country and income 
distribution is concerned.  
iv) The players of such sectors may be identified through a broad based 
survey aimed at recognizing pockets and clusters of areas where such economic activities 
are taking place. In Pakistan, that means slums and other underdeveloped habitats usually 
engaged in a particular trade en bloc. For instance, Karachi’s cattle colony engages in 
buffalo milk trade where almost every house is a mini dairy farm. Similarly, in other areas 
people develop cottage industries such as those of bangles (women’s ornamental accessory) 
in Hyderabad in order to have economies of scale and local expertise.  
 
v) The next stage to identification of such players is the realization and 
calculation of economic impact of their activities including downward linkages to other 
informal sectors, mainly general labor, which is affected by every activity formal or 
otherwise. Employment generation potential must be one of the most important yardsticks 
by which a sector be evaluated in terms of future tax potential and formalization process.  
 
vi) The informal sector players may be encouraged to form an association 
where it is feasible and further negotiations regarding tax treatment should be made within 
that forum. This strategy has worked well with the formal sector in Pakistan and can also 
be successfully replicated in the informal sector. 
 
vii) For a period of three years, all the players of a particular sector may be 
granted exemption/waiver from PIT initially for a period of 3 years. 
 
viii) Gross Profit Ratio of the sector may be determined through analysis of 
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business and the taxpayers may be required to file nominal PIT Returns during the period 
of waiver. This will not only ensure correct determination of income potential in the sector 
but will also induce a habit of keeping documentation and records of all transactions by 
the taxpayer. Strict vigilance in this regard is required from the FBR so that the taxpayer, 
while enjoying the benefits of waiver, should not remain lax of his national duty by 
providing valuable information regarding the business income potential. 
 
ix) During this period the FBR must determine a threshold Gross Profit Ratio 
for the particular sector over and above which the taxpayer may be taxed as per 
Provisional Tax Regime. This scheme envisages a tax at a fixed percentage of Gross Sales 
rather than Income of a particular taxpayer because of various reasons such as huge 
number of taxpayers, non documentation of transactions, economic and accounting 
illiteracy of taxpayer and practical difficulties in keeping transaction records, etc. 
 
x) When the Gross Profit Ratio is achieved for a continued 3 year period, the 
household/informal enterprise may be registered as a regular taxpayer i.e. formalized. 
 
xi) Normal taxation may be undertaken once the business is formalized. 
Obviously, there would be a crystallization period during which time the practical realities 
of the policy will have to be incorporated in a rationalized way in order to achieve an 
optimum level of efficiency in implementation of this scheme.  
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 CONCLUSION 
 Informal sector taxation is a sensitive topic. On the one hand, there is the 
realization that extreme poverty, hardship and challenges to survival warrant exemption 
from any form of taxation. On the other hand, principles of economic justice and equality 
demand that any form of income must be taxed especially that of the informal sector 
(which sometimes include illegal sectors as well such as drugs and smuggling). Political 
patronage to slum dwellers also means that the government is never really serious about 
introducing a long term strategy for taxing the poor properly and relies on stop gap 
arrangements. One of these methods is provision of subsidy on various goods such as 
electricity and petroleum which policy is self defeating in that it raises the price of every 
other commodity and the lot of the poor is not ameliorated. 
  
 It is therefore, of the utmost importance that the extent, scope and economic value 
of the informal enterprise may be estimated thoroughly and measures devised to formulate 
it effectively within the mainstream. One of those ways is suggested in this dissertation 
which deals with the practical realities of informality in Pakistan. If the concept is 
incorporated in government policy, it can have a substantial impact on formalization 
efforts in the country and may help to bring a large number of taxpayers within the ambit 
of income taxation. 
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